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Abstract
Up to 80 percent of developed countries currency is held by
foreigners mostly in LDC's constituting an interest free loan from
the LDC's to the developed countries. The extent of these loans is
in the neighborhood of $600 billion. In addition the domestic
transactions demand for currency is shown to be interest and income
inelastic making the demand for M. seriously nonhomogeneous and
creating substantial problems for money demand functions and macro-
economic models. It is suggested that to relieve these problems,
currency should be excluded from the definition of M.
.

The results of two recent surveys of currency behavior commissioned
by the Federal Reserve were reported by Avery, Elliehausen, Kennickell,
and Spindt in the February 1986 and May 1987 Federal Reserve Bulletins .
The surveys raise a substantial number of questions about the house-
hold demand for currency. They also conclude that a major portion of
the total demand for currency is unexplained. These results lead to
substantial implications for money demand functions, macroeconomic
models, domestic and international monetary theory and policy, and
even for the definition of money. Part I describes household currency
behavior starting from the survey results. Part II discusses other
currency demands including the likelihood of large foreign holdings.
Part III concludes with some implications for monetary and macro
theory and policy.
I. The Household Demand for Currency
The microeconomics of currency demand appears to be so trivial
that it has, supposedly safely, been ignored. Rational economic
agents will only desire currency for transactions purposes and transac-
tions needs will be a (simple) function of income. With the introduc-
tion of interest bearing checking accounts more than a decade ago,
however, casual theorizing should suggest that the demand for currency
should now be interest elastic, and in general more complex. Along
this line a model jointly optimizing with respect to maximum size of
transaction using currency and number of times currency is obtained
has been developed by Whitesell (1989).
The Federal Reserve results, however, suggest that this mode of
theorizing is not realistic in describing actual household behavior
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with respect to currency demand. Consider the results from the sur-
veys reproduced in Table I. The Median Dollars acquired, Median
Dollars on Hand Before Acquisition and Mean Average Currency Balance
all show zero cross section income elasticity, but the Mean Monthly
Currency Expenditures shows significant income elasticity.
How can these results be explained? It seems most likely that the
explanation lies in a different type of household optimizing process
than that which economists would usually suggest. Households maximize
utility in cash management by deciding on the optimal amount of cur-
rency to obtain. Too much currency on hand is uncomfortable because
of the risk of theft or loss. Too little currency on hand is uncom-
fortable because of inconvenience. The decision process does not
involve the usual transaction costs. Most particularly it does not
involve as part of transactions costs, the value of time, since this
would presumably result in still higher currency holdings for upper
income households.
In addition to the Federal Reserve Survey results there are some
ad hoc survey results which support and strengthen the case. For some
time now I have surveyed faculty, executive MBA students (average age
35) and local business and professional people as to their currency
habits. These results suggest that households, when obtaining
currency, have a standardized and round number in mind. For most the
amount is $100; for a few substantially more, $150-$200, and for a few
others $50-$75. Currency is obtained as needed with the amount on
hand fairly low—about $20. Of additional interest is the result that
for most, these standardized amounts have stayed constant for a long
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tirae—about a decade or so. This suggests that not only is there no
cross section income elasticity, but in addition any time series income
elasticity is small and subject to very long lags. Finally, there
appears to be no interest elasticity despite most respondents having
some type of interest bearing checking account. This should not be
surprising since the interest gains from economizing on the holding of
currency are negligible.
Given these results, the household demand for currency seems much
more interesting. If households obtain a (very slowly changing)
standardized amount of currency, currency demand is income inelastic.
Furthermore, it does not depend on the fraction or dollar amount of
transactions made using currency. If the typical household obtains
$100 of currency, Its average holding is $50 plus the small amount on
hand when additional currency is obtained, no matter if it spends
$1000 or $100 per month using currency. The conclusion then must be
that the household transactions demand for currency is independent of
income, the fraction of income spent using currency, and interest
rates. In fact it is a constant in the short run. In (substantially)
longer runs, it should have some income elasticity as households over
time adjust their standardized amount of currency obtained and clearly
should depend on the rate of household formation.
The fact that currency demanded by households for transactions
purposes is a constant does not mean that this household transactions
demand for narrow money en toto also is nonhomogeneous. Given a
constant expenditure rate for simplicity, T Is total expenditures per
period and C is the standardized currency amount obtained, currency
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holdings will average C/2 and checkable accounts T/2 - C/2. The total
transactions demand then is T/2 and income elastic since T is a func-
tion of income. If checkable account holdings vary with interest rate
differentials, then the household transactions demand for money is
also interest elastic. However, the constant currency demand results
in the same but negative constant term for checkable accounts. Thus
the usual assumption of homogeneous money demand functions will be
inappropriate for demand functions for individual money components.
In particular the use of log/semi log functions for either currency or
checkable accounts will lead to raisspecif ication.
II. The Total Demand for Currency
Probably the most intriguing result of the Federal Reserve survey
and certainly the most newsworthy is that the mean household currency
balance of about $110 when aggregated up for all households results in
explaining only 11 or 12 percent of the currency in the hands of the
public in 1984 and 1986. In 1986 currency in the hands of the public
was about $177 billion and the aggregated up household demand just
under $20 billion. With currency in the hands of the public in April
1990 of $230 billion and a 2 percent annual rate of growth in number
of households assumed, the percentage of currency holdings now
explained will have fallen to under 10 percent.
Then who holds the "missing" currency, and for what purposes? The
possibilities include children under 18 years, who are not included in
the survey, household hoarding, business firms, the underground economy,
and foreign holders. The survey did collect information on the amount
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of currency held by households for other than transactions purposes.
Aggregating up, these balances are an estimated $3.3 billion. The
1987 Federal Reserve Bulletin cites an Internal Revenue Service report
of 1983, Income Tax Compliance Research , that suggests, under reason-
able assumptions, currency holdings for the underground economy of
about $9 billion. Business holdings of currency estimated by Anderson
(1977) and updated by Sumner (1990) for 1986 amounts to about $5
billion.
Adding these amounts up, we get a total of about $37 billion of
currency holdings explained out of a total $177 billion of currency in
the hands of the public in 1986, or about 21 percent explained. If
the household transaction demand for currency increased at the rate of
growth of household formation, and the other demands at the rate of
growth of income from 1986 through 1989 the total explained demand
would be $44 billion out of about $230 billion or about 19 percent
explained. This leaves about $140 billion in 1986 and about $185
billion in 1989 in the hands of children under 18 years and foreigners.
No one would seriously suggest children as the chief holders of cur-
rency leaving foreigners as the likely suspects for holding our
currency.
The rough magnitude of the missing money obtained from the Federal
Reserve survey is confirmed by others using quite different estimating
techniques. Sumner (1990), see also the literature cited there, ob-
tains the same type of results through analysis of seasonal demands
and the demands for currency by individual denominations. He, and
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others , refer to the unexplained portion as simply "hoarding," but by
whom is unclear.
The Federal Reserve study (1987) as well as Sunmer are reluctant
to attribute large amounts of the missing currency to foreigners'
holdings. The primary reason for this reluctance is that the missing
currency seems unaffected by dollar exchange rates or the position of
the U.S. in the world economy. "The survey estimates, however,
suggest that the missing proportion did not change between 1984 and
1986 despite the sharp depreciation of the dollar against Japanese and
European currencies" (Federal Reserve Bulletin , 1987, p. 191). A
secondary reason is that per capita cash holdings are also high for
other developed nations so that U.S., currency holdings are not neces-
sarily unique or mysterious.
I believe these arguments against large foreign holdings of cur-
rency are misguided. That foreign holders of U.S. currency should
significantly adjust their holdings with changes in the U.S. exchange
rate suggests substantial sophistication. The very terms we use,
Foreign Currency Traders and Markets, may lead us astray; however, it
is clear that foreign currency markets never trade currency but rather
other assets denominated in various currencies. Sophisticated
economic agents presumably would not hold foreign currency at all,
just foreign denominated assets. The Argentinian taxi driver or the
Algerian bell hop would like to have the American tourist or business-
man's dollars, but would also appreciate the Italian's lire or the
Japanese's yen If that is who is arriving. The foreign worker is
happy to take home dollars if working In the U.S. or Deutschmarks if
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worklng in Germany. The point is, any hard currency is worth obtaining
compared with the domestic currency in many countries.
Given this desire for hard currency it is not at all surprising
that the per capita currency holdings for the U.S. is not greatly dif-
ferent from that for the other hard currency countries. Using data
from the IMF's International Financial Statistics for mid 1989, the
per capita currency holding for the U.S. was only ninth highest out of
the 22 industrialized countries (see Table II). For the developed,
hard currency countries as a group then, domestic demand for currency
is highly unlikely to explain a major portion of their total currency
demand. That foreigners do in fact hold the major share of developed
countries' currency does not seem unreasonable. Furthermore once the
currency leaves the issuing country it is unlikely to return. Instead
it will be circulated abroad in competition with the local currencies.
The "dollarization" of Latin America may only be one example of this
phenomenon. Equally of interest may be the "Yenization" (Yenning?)
of Southeast Asia, the Francization of northern Africa, and the
Deutschmarking and Swiss Francing of just about everywhere.
III. Some Implications
To the extent* that the missing currency is foreign held, its
demand will be similar to the household transactions demand for
currency in that it will be independent of the issuing countries'
income and interest rates. Thus the currency demand functions for
developed economies have very large constant terms indeed. And
contrary to household transactions demand holdings, the foreign
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holdings of currency are not offset by a reduction in the holdings of
domestic checkable accounts as shown above. The foreign holdings of
currency result in a constant term in the demand functions for total
narrow money as well as for currency. This means that the standard
methods of estimating narrow money (and broader money to a lesser
extent) demand functions using log/semi log methods will lead to mis-
specification. How serious might this be? The missing currency is
almost 80 percent of total currency in the hands of the public. In
the U.S., currency in the hands of the public is almost 30 percent of
M., and thus foreign holdings in the extreme would be close to a
quarter of M-. A degree of nonhomogeneity of that magnitude would
seem to be serious indeed. Furthermore such nonhomogeneity is clearly
not only a problem for money demand equations, but also for many macro-
economic models whose assumptions are clearly violated.
To the extent that the missing currency is foreign held, it is not
a medium of exchange for the issuing country. Increases in currency
in the hands of the public in developed countries then should not be
considered as money supply increases for monetary policy decisions.
In fact the Federal Reserve and other central banks should ignore such
increases as being basically irrelevant to domestic monetary condi-
tions.
These implications suggest a rather startling conclusion. Since
the inclusion of currency for money demand functions and macro models
as well as for monetary policy considerations causes problems, why
should currency be considered part of the money supply? Why not
define M. to be simply current M, less currency in the hands of the
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public, and by analogy do the same for broader measures of money (for
which, however, the constant term will be relatively smaller and
therefore less troublesome). This would save money demand functions
as well as macro models and in addition give the Federal Reserve a
more useful and less misleading figure to use in the conduct of mone-
tary policy.
Turn now to the implications for the countries whose residents
hold the foreign currencies. Since the currency mainly does not
return to the issuing country, but instead circulates or is hoarded
in the foreign countries, the issuing countries obtain seigniorage
in the form of interest free loans from these countries. To the ex-
tent that developed countries* currencies are held by residents in the
other developed countries these loans may not be considered of great
importance, but to the extent that the holders of foreign currency are
residents of LDC's, the problem is immediate and acute. The LDC's as
a group are in effect giving interest free loans to the developed
economies as a group and thereby exacerbating the international debt
crisis. In fact this might be considered the second international
debt crisis.
How large might this second crisis be? The answer depends on
estimating the total foreign holdings of the currencies of the
developed economies, and then estimating the proportion of these
holdings held by LDC residents. The data in Table II suggest two
possible ways of estimating total foreign holdings. First, it might
be assumed that the developed countries on average have the same per-
centage of unexplained currency as the U.S., 81 percent. Given this
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assuraption, with total developed country currency in the hands of the
public of 589 billion SDR's, total foreign holdings would be 476
billion SDR's. Second, the data in Table II show two clear outliers,
Iceland and New Zealand, for which per capita currency holdings are
very low. These two countries are very small, relatively isolated,
and do not have significant numbers of foreign workers. It is doubt-
ful if much if any of their currency is in foreign hands. Knowing of
no domestic peculiarities of currency demand In these two countries,
we might assume that their per capita currency holdings of about 150
SDR's might represent the domestic per capita currency holdings of all
developed countries. The total population of 776.56 million (from
column 2) times 150 SDR's per capita gives 116.48 billion SDR's for
the total domestic demand. Subtracting the 116.48 billion SDR's from
the total of 588.62 billion yields foreign holdings of 472 billion
SDR's—amazingly close to the 476 billion SDR estimate obtained from
the first method using the U.S. figure of 81 percent unexplained and
presumably foreign held. Thus two quite independent methods of
estimating foreign holdings of developed countries' currency yield not
only the same ball-park estimates, but almost precisely the same
amount. Suggestive, to say the least.
The figure of 476 billion SDR's, which at the mid-1989 SDR value
of the U.S. dollar of 1.2464 equals $593 billion, is clearly sub-
stantial. If most of this currency is held by residents of LDC's,
the "second" international debt crisis is large indeed. With the
total of LDC debt to developed countries of somewhere between $800
and $900 billion, the Interest free loans from currency holdings to
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the developed countries could be as high as two-thirds to three-
quarters of this amount in addition. Since no data exists as to LDC
holdings of developed country currency, the interested reader is free
to choose the proportion, but my own suggestion is that the proportion
is large. Developed country holdings of other developed countries'
currencies should be primarily for convenience in transacting. Major
holdings of foreign "currencies" should instead be held as foreign
denominated deposits on other assets.
Given the probability that LDC holdings of developed country
currencies are large, the point made above as to the definition of
money and the conduct of monetary policy in developed countries should
be made in reverse for LDC's. For any LDC's where there are substan-
tial concentrations of foreign currency, this currency should be
included in the domestic money supply and included in monetary policy
decision making. Such inclusions clearly will affect the possibil-
ities and possible gains from expansionary monetary policies leading
primarily to inflation.
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Table I
Median Median Dollars Mean Average Mean Monthly
Doll ars on Hand Before Currency Currency
Acqu
1984
ilred
1986
Acquisition
1984 1986
Balance Expendi
1984
ture
Family Income 1984 1986 1986
<$10,000 80 100 10 5 97 120 297 331
$10,000-19,999 100 70 15 7 105 98 421 440
$20,000-29,999 63 100 15 10 92 120 412 433
$30,000-49,999 75 65 20 10 105 102 464 514
>$50,000 100 80 20 15 101 126 528 473
Source: 1984 data, Federal Reserve Bulletin
,
February 1986, Table 11,
page 100 and Table 12, page 102.
1986 data, Federal Reserve Bulletin
,
March 1987, Table 12,
page 189.
Table II (mld-1989 Figures)
(1) (2) (3)
Currency Per capita
(billions Population currency
Country of SDR's) (millions) in SDR's
Australia 7.39 16.81 440
Austria 5.99 7.62 786
Belgium 8.22 9.88 832
Canada 12.59 26.25 480
Denmark 2.33 5.13 454
Finland 1.49 4.97 301
France 28.65 56.16 510
Germany 58.72 61.64 953
Greece 3.21 10.01 321
Iceland .0378 .25 151
Ireland 1.31 3.51 373
Italy 32.16 57.52 559
Japan 171.16 123.12 1390
Netherlands 12.90 14.83 870
New Zealand .480 3.31 146
Norway 3.04 4.23 718
Portugal 2.47 10.47 236
Spain 22.30 39.09 571
Sweden 6.40 8.50 753
Switzerland 13.71 6.65 2062
U.K. 18.92 57.20 331
U.S. 175.14 249.41 702
Total 588.62 776.56
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics, September 1990.
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